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INTRODUCTION
2
In the context of criminal punishment, "children are different." Since the turn of

the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has shielded juvenile offenders from the
harshest punishments offered by the criminal justice system. In a trilogy of cases, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty
to juvenile offenders, 3 and later extended that protection to prohibit mandatory life
4
without parole (hereinafter LWOP) sentences. Central to the Court's reasoning in
acceptance that juveniles exhibit
growing
each case was the scientific community's
in reckless behavior due to their
to
engage
a
predisposition
and
lower impulse control
incomplete cognitive development.5 In Miller, Justice Kagan identified "immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences" as "hallmark features"
of adolescence.6 Generally, then, these decisions emphasize that the severity of the
punishments available to juvenile criminal defendants requires limiting due to the
consequences of their cognitive development.
Alongside the growth of Eighth Amendment protection of juvenile offenders,
many states, including Kentucky, have taken steps to construct a fairer juvenile
7
sentencing system through ongoing litigation and legislative reform. In the wake of
the Court's decision in Miller, several individuals sentenced to life without parole
8
are now challenging their convictions, with varying degrees of success. Despite this
improvement, significant work yet remains before Kentucky's juvenile offenders
receive the fundamental fairness owed to them.
An area of significant concern in the juvenile justice system is plea bargaining.
Approximately ninety-five percent of all criminal convictions are obtained through
9
plea negotiations; research shows these rates are similar for juveniles. In order for a
must find the defendant to have entered this plea
guilty plea to be effective, the 'court
"voluntarily and intelligently." 0 The Court's acceptance of a sentencing framework
based on cognitive development however, creates friction when assessing 1the
I
competence of minors. The Court noted this tension in both Miller and Graham.
One specific area of concern is the acceptance of "hammer clause" provisions in
guilty plea agreements for juvenile defendants. A "hammer clause" is "a provision
in a plea agreement which, in lieu of bail, allows the defendant, after entry of his
2 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,480 (2012).
3 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
4 Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
6

IId. at 477.

id.

7See KY. REV.STAT. ANN. § 610.220(2) (West 2019) (reducing the amount of time that low-level
juvenile offenders were required to spend in specialized treatment and detention centers in order to give
priority to higher-level offenders).
Associated Press, 4 in Kentucky Seek New Sentences /br Juvenile Murder Cases, COURIER J. (July

31, 2017, 11:01 PM), https://www.courier-jounal.com/story/news/crime/2017/08/01/4-kentucky-seeksee also Phon v.
new-sentences-juvenile-murder-cases/527984001 / [perma.cc/L2GD-KV44];
Commonwealth, 545 S.W3d 284, 288 (Ky. 2018).
' Allison D. Redlich & Reveka V. Shteynberg, To Pleador Not to Plead:A Comparison of Juvenile
and Adult True and FalsePlea Decisions, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 611 (2016).

..Brady v.United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
" Miller, 567 U.S. at 477, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
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guilty plea, to remain out of jail pending final sentencing."' 12 If the defendant
complies with the conditions of the plea agreement, then the prosecution will
recommend a certain, typically lower than the maximum, sentence. " If the defendant
4
violates the agreement, the prosecution will "throw the book at them" so to speak. 1
The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the use of hammer clauses in adult cases,
provided the judge not abuse his discretion by committing herself to impose the
maximum sentence at the plea hearing.' 5 Despite their upholding of the practice, the
court expressed wariness with the practice and emphasized that they were
discomforted by these clauses' reliance on the threat ofjudicial enforcement.' 6
This Note argues that the law's recognition that a juvenile's cognitive
development ought to influence the understanding of their culpability should be
extended to the understanding of a juvenile's capacity in plea negotiations. If courts
are willing to concede that juveniles lack sufficient decision-making ability so as to
justify barring of certain fonrs of punishment, then the lack of mature decisionmaking functions ought to bar them from being bound to plea agreements that impose
strict conditions with harsh penalties contingent upon-and often inhibited
by-those same functions.
Part I of this Note will first discuss the historical purpose behind the separation
of juveniles into a separate legal class and outline the procedure of the criminal
proceedings at issue throughout the rest of the Note. Part 1i will trace the Supreme
Court's gradual acceptance of a development-based juvenile justice system through
its jurisprudence and provide an overview of contemporary, psychological research
related to juvenile decision-making. Part III examines the potential harms faced by
juvenile defendants in the plea bargain process, focusing specifically on "hammer
clauses" often found in Kentucky guilty pleas. Finally, Part IV will advocate a
two-part solution: first, the prohibition of the use of hammer clauses in juvenile
criminal cases and second, a plea system with increased oversight to ensure that
juvenile offenders are provided the fairest process possible.
1. STRUCTURE OF TIlE JUVENILE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

This section proceeds in two parts. First, this section provides a brief overview
of the history of juvenile criminal law in America since the nineteenth century. The
through-line of this historical account is the simultaneous decline in the juvenile
justice system's emphasis on rehabilitation and the increase in social concern over
serious offenses committed by juveniles. Second, this section explains the policy
benefits derived from increased reliance on plea bargains, as well as the resulting

costs.

12Knox v. Commonwealth, 361 S W.3d 891, 893 (Ky. 2012).
13Id.
4

' Seeid. at 893 94.
Jd. at 899.
"' Id.
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A. History of.Juvenile Justice

Originally, the juvenile court system developed in order to rehabilitatechildren
rather than punish offending conduct.' 7 Key to this distinction was the view that
children were less culpable for their actions and punishment should be limited
accordingly.' I The states attempted to realize this philosophical goal of rehabilitation
through the creation of non-adversarial courts where the machinery of the state
19
would work together in order to protect the best interest of the child. Early juvenile
courts attempted to achieve these goals in both form and substance: terms of art such
as "warrants" and "trials" were replaced by "petitions" and "dispositions," and
2
hearings were conducted in private to avoid public stigma. " At each stage in the
process, juvenile courts attempted to distinguish themselves from ordinary criminal
tribunals.
Over time, state legislatures across the country began to direct more juveniles
21
into adult courts, especially when "serious" offenses were at issue. Juveniles were
known
otherwise
waiver,
entered into adult courts via two methods: (1) legislative
22
mandate
statutes
bindover
These
waiver.
as "bindover" statutes, and (2) judicial
that juveniles charged with certain offenses be excluded from juvenile court and
instead tried "as an adult."'21 Proponents of legislative waiver argue that individuals
who commit certain serious offenses, regardless of their age, are incapable of
correction and the juvenile system, with its focus on rehabilitation, would be wasted
24

on them.

In addition to mandatory bindover statutes, most states also allow for judicial
waiver. This form of waiver occurs when the state files a motion requesting that a
juvenile be tried outside of juvenile court, and the juvenile court holds a bindover

"7 Susan R. Bell, Comment, Ohio Gets Tough on Juvenile Crime: An Analysis of Ohio's 1996
Amendments Concerning the Bindover of Violent Juvenile Offenders to the Adult System and Related

Legislation, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.207, 209 (1997). Illinois established the nation's first juvenile court in
1899 in response to pressure from Progressive Era social activists who sought to instill moral virtue in
child offenders in order to prevent children from becoming lifelong criminals. Id at 215-16; see also D.
Brian Woo, Cudgel or Carrot: I-ow Roper v.Simmons Will Affect Plea Bargaining in the Juvenile System,

7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 475,483 (2007).
1 Francis Berry McCarthy, The Serious q/fender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for
Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 641 (1994).
'9See Bell, supra note 17, at 209.
20 Id.
21 Id. at215 16.
2 See Woo, supra

note 17, at 484; see also Matthew William Bell, Comment, Prosecutorial Waiver
in Michigan and Nationwide, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2004) (characterizing the emergence
of waiver statutes as a recognition that certain juvenile offenders are beyond rehabilitation).
21 See Woo, supra note 17, at 484. An example of a bindover statute is a Michigan law that allows
for defendants between the ages of 14 and 18 to be charged as an adult if the crime they are accused of
committing is designated as a felony or punishable by more than one year in prison. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 712A.2d (West 2020). Such statutes are common across the nation. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2152.12(A)(l)(a)(i) (ii) (West 2020).
2"See DAVID L, MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENIIE COURT: THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 28 (2001) ("[T]he decision to transfer a case still denotes that a youthful
offender is beyond whatever treatment capacity remains in the juvenile justice system.").
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hearing in response to the motion.25 At that hearing, the judge must consider: (1) if
it is credible that the juvenile committed the offense, and (2) if the juvenile is
amenable to rehabilitation. 21 Most states grant the juvenile court judge significant
discretion in this judgment.
In modern times, increasing numbers of juveniles have been bound over to adult
27
courts due to increased public pressure to punish serious and capital offenders.
Scholars note that homicides committed by juveniles receive significantly greater
media attention than homicides committed by adults. 21 Simultaneously, studies show
that public confidence in rehabilitative models of justice is declining. 29 Increased
media attention arguably increases the pressure on the agents of the state--the
prosecution-to reach a result that the public finds just.30 This confluence of
decreased public trust in rehabilitation and increased options to punish juveniles as
adults results in an increase in the number ofjuveniles who are subject to the harshest
penalties the justice system has to offer.
B. The Role of PleaBargaining
An emerging reality of the American criminal justice system is that the vast
majority of prosecutions are resolved through plea bargain rather than trial.3" From
the perspective of a defendant, accepting a guilty plea poses numerous potential
advantages. First, the entry of a guilty plea ensures a swift resolution to judicial
proceedings.32 Second, a defendant may judge the risk of receiving a guilty verdict,
accompanied by a longer sentence, as too great and decide to accept the plea as a
way of mitigating the harm of their conviction. 33 From an institutional standpoint,
plea bargains3 4increase efficiency by reducing the number of pending cases in the
court system.
In spite of these benefits, a realistic account of the criminal justice system's
increased reliance on plea bargains must take account of the harms this practice has
on defendants. The aforementioned account of the benefits of pleas relies on the
assumption that the machinery of the criminal justice system does not advantage one
party over the other or any class of defendant more than another. This, however, is
not always the case. For one, in the current federal sentencing regime based on
limited judicial discretion and mandatory minimum statutes, the prosecution plays
21See Bell, supra note 17, at 214- 15,
21 Id; see also McCarthy, supra note 18, at 631 32.
27See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 641 -42.
2 Elena R. Laskin, How ParentalLiability Statutes Criminalize and Stigmatize Minority Mothers, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2000) (arguing that serious crimes committed by juveniles receive
increased and sensationalized news coverage emphasizing that the child who committed the offense was
disturbed).
21McCarthy, supra note 18, at 641 42.
3"Woo, supra note 17, at 49 1.
"' See Redlich & Shteynberg, supra note 9,at 611.
32See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) ("[Clriminal Justice today is for the most part i
system of pleas, not a system of trials.").
" Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL.OGY 949,
950 51 (1986).
" George Fisher, Plea Bargaining'sTriumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 989 (2000).
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35
an outsized role in determining the punishment faced by a defendant. Across both
the federal and state systems, prosecutors enjoy wide latitude in their decision of
36
initial charges to file, which shapes the course of plea negotiations going forward.
The National District Attorney's Association articulates a standard that a
prosecutor's role in plea negotiations is to balance the interests of the state alongside
those of the juvenile.3 7 And undoubtedly many prosecutors adhere faithfully to this
standard. However, the level of discretion places a great deal of power in the hands
of individual actors that, as individuals, may be susceptible to implicit biases

regarding defendants."

A related, but distinct harm is the disengagement of the defendant from the
negotiation process. While the procedural protection of the right to counsel is
essential to ensuring fairness in the justice system, a defendant's control over plea
negotiations is limited.39 As such, a key decision in the plea negotiation process is
the choice of the defendant to trust that his counsel is obtaining the best possible
outcome. Given the complexity of these negotiations, however, many defendants
lack the perspective necessary to make such a judgment. The result is a defendant's
a
resigned disengagement from the process as a whole." In the case of juveniles, this
risk of disengagement or poor decision-making is amplified because of the unique
41
cognitive attribute they possess at their stage of development.
II. A DEVELOPMENTAL

APPROACH TO JUVENILE JUSTICE

A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
A central tension in the development of juvenile criminal law and procedure is
whether the juvenile defendant should be treated more like an adult-thus receiving
the increased procedural protection of the criminal court--or acknowledging that
juveniles are different from adults in many ways, especially from a developmental
standpoint. The Supreme Court has grappled with this tension on nmerous
occasions, and the policies undergirding those decisions provide guidance on how
the law should treat juveniles during the plea negotiation process.
" M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparityin Federal CriminalSentences, 122 J. POL.
ECON. 1320, 1326 (2014) ("Legal scholars, judges and practitioners broadly agree that prosecutorial
decisions play a dominant role in determining sentences,").
16 See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors,91
MARQUETTE L. REV. 9, 9 10 (2007).
37 Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Plea Bargainingin Juvenile Court, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 61, 62.
38 Carlos Berdej6, CriminalizingRace: RacialDisparitiesin Plea-Bargaining,59 B.C. L. REV. 1187,
1190 91 (2018) (arguing that prosecutors may rely on proxies, such as race, as a proxy for criminal
attributes given the limited information, times, and resources they possess); see also Jerry Kang et al.,
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1140-41 (arguing that the lack of accountability
for prosecutors charging decisions, combined with wide prosecutorial discretion, creates a risk of implicit
biases impacting prosecutorial decision-making).
" See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in TIlE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71,
85- 87 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
411 See Redlich & Shteynberg, supra note 9, at 622 ("Further, observers noted that 'many of the
').
children looked bewildered or disengaged during the plea colloquy ..
41 See in/ra p. 14.

2019-2020

WHY USE A HAMMER WHEN A SCALPEL WILL Do?

719

The Court's seminal decision, In re Gault, exemplifies this tension.4 2 Gault
concerned the due process rights owed to a juvenile defendant in a delinquency
hearing.43 The Court held that children must be afforded the same due process
protections as adults in a criminal case. 44 Central to the Court's reasoning was the
majority's disavowal of the paternalistic model ofjuvenile court proceedings. 45 The
Court reasoned that increased procedural protections would increase the
rehabilitative efforts of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the defendant is
being treated fairly.46 In the following years, the Court would require that judicial
waiver of a juvenile to adult criminal court required a hearing,4 7 as well as extend
the beyond reasonable doubt standard to delinquency proceedings. 4 ' The
foundational principle underlying this expansion ofjuvenile procedural rights is that
"good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
9
safeguards in juvenile courts ....
The emergence of increased procedural safeguards has not been met with
universal acceptance. One family of disagreements conceptualizes the juvenile
courts as a separate institutional body with different goals and competencies."' Under
this line of thinking, the procedural safeguards of the adult criminal court are
inappropriate for the juvenile court system because the juvenile court is not supposed
to be adversarial. 5 As such, the implementation of an adversarial process into these
52
proceedings conflicts with the rehabilitative ideals of the juvenile court system.
This category of disagreements is both intemally unsound and inapplicable to the
discussion of plea bargains.53 Another family of scholarship provides a more
nuanced approach. According to this second body of thought, the importation of
procedural safeguards themselves poses no institutional harm; but the broader
conception of juveniles as analogous to adults for purposes of criminal proceedings
poses harmful collateral consequences. 54 In particular, the decline of separate
42

387 U.S. 1 (1967).

41 See id.
44 Id. at 4.

45 Id. at 25 26 ("The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly
judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal
advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State
provided
guidance and help 'to save him from a downward career."'),
4
1 Id. at 26.
" Kent v United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1 966). The court based its holding on the understanding that
a juvenile court does not have unlimited parens patriae power and must not act with "procedural
arbitrariness." Id. at 554 55.
41 n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44
Id. at 365 66.
" See Gault, 387 U.S. at 78 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
52 id.

5' The majority dispenses with the institutional objection of the dissent by reference to the
consequences of the juvenile court proceeding. Specifically, delinquent juveniles were confined to an
institution and had their liberty restricted; confinement is sufficiently analogous to incarceration, which
is a hallmark punishment of adult criminal proceedings. See id. at 27 (majority opinion)
14 See Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. Ciii. L- RIEV 39, 46 (2003)
(arguing that
Gault failed to consider how procedural due process rights could be shaped to address the unique needs
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juvenile courts led to an increase in the number of juveniles tried as adults, via
55
legislative or judicial waiver. This influx of juveniles into adult courts occurred
simultaneously to an increased in severity in sentencing, including the spread of
LWOP sentences, the proliferation of mandatory minimums, and the abolition of
parole in many states.5 6 Thus, a collateral consequence of increasing procedural
protections for juveniles by reference to adult criminal proceedings is that an
increasing number of juveniles will be punished like adults.
While the latter half of the twentieth century saw the backslide of rehabilitative
models of juvenile criminal justice modeled on progressive era moral education, the
turn of the millennium saw the emergence of new approaches to juvenile justice
reform that rely on cognitive science. One line of thought that recently found its
footing in the Supreme Court is a developmental approach to juvenile justice. The
most important principle to this approach is that criminal choices are, in part,
motivated by developmental factors, and, as such, youthful criminal defendants are
judged to be less culpable than adults who commit similar crimes because their
57
cognitive development inhibits their decision-making ability.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons provides an early
5
articulation of this developmental approach. 1 In Roper, the Court held that the
execution of individuals who were under eighteen years old at the time they
59
committed their offense violated the Eighth Amendment. There, the defendant,
and
Christopher Simmons, had been convicted of murder in the first degree
60
While
Crook.
Shirley
of
sentenced to death for planning and committing the murder
Mr. Simmons was eighteen years old at the time he was sentenced, he was seventeen
at the time of the crime.6" Following sentencing, Simmons' defense counsel put on
evidence about the defendant's "immature" and "impulsive" behavior in a petition
62
for the court to set aside its judgment. In spite of this, the trial court refused to set
stage in the appellate
aside its judgment and Simmons' lost at each subsequent
63
process until the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
Two related strands of reasoning influenced the Court's decision in Roper. First,
the Court acknowledged that the question of whether a given punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment depends on whether the practice violated society's evolving
standards of decency. 64 As such, the definition of crel and unusual punishment
evolves over time and the Court must consider whether a "national consensus"
of the juvenile courts and created talse dichotomy between adult rights or the absence of rights); see also
ELIZABETIH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBURG, RETHtINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 12021 (2008).

'5 See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 670.
56

Elizabeth

S.

Scott

et

al.,

The

Supreme

Court

and
I

the

Transformation

2015),
(Sept.
https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/publication_ pdfs/Tbe Supreme Court and the Transformation of Juv
enile Sentencing%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6DW-8JRQ].
Juvenile

of

Sentencing,

MODELS

5 SCOTT & STEINBIERG, supra note 54, at 130.

See 543 US. 551 (2005).
59

d. at 551.

61

id. at 556.

61 ld. at 557.
62

ld. at 559.

63 id.
64

Id, at 564.
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prohibits the practice in question.65 In the case of the juvenile death penalty, thirty
states had banned the death penalty by the time of the Roper decision.66 The Court
relied on this fact to demonstrate a consistent line of thought among the several
states, and this fact weighed in favor of the juvenile death penalty's abolishment.6 7
In support of this holding, Justice Kennedy articulated three conclusions of
modern social science to support the claim that juveniles should bear less culpability
than their adult counterparts. First, the Court stated that juveniles' "underdeveloped
sense of responsibility"6 " leads to their being "overrepresented statistically in
virtually every category of reckless behavior."69 Second, the Court acknowledged
that juveniles are "more ... susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures
70
. . ." in part due to the fact that they have less control over their environment.
Finally, the Court accepted the premise that a juvenile's "character" is not fully
developed. 7 ' As a result, the "personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less
fixed[,]" than adults." The Court's acceptance of these three premises leads to the
conclusion that the "penological justifications" for capital punishment are less wellfounded in the case of juveniles than in. the case of adults because their incomplete
73
development entails diminished culpability.
The Court developed the idea ofjuvenile's diminished culpability five years later
in Graham v. Florida,holding that mandatory LWOP sentences for non-homicide
offenses violated the Eighth Amendment.74 Then in 2012, the Court decided Miller
v. Alabama and extended the holding of Graham to cover homicide. 71 Justice
Kagan's majority opinion, in that case, contained the strongest articulation to date of
a developmental framework to juvenile sentencing. In Miller, the Court emphasized
that the central dilemna in each of these cases with the disparity between the severity
of the punishment with the culpability of a class of offenders.7 6 Alongside this
dilemma is the growing scientific consensus that there are "fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds." 77 For the Court, these cognitive differences
7
warrant "constitutional[] differe[nces]" in the way the law treats juvenile offenders. 8

'5

Id. The concept of a "national consensus" is gauged in part by the enactments of legislatures that

have considered the question at issue, Id.
66 id.
" See id. at 566 67.
61 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
1 Id. (quoting Jeffrey Amett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12
DEVELOPMENTAI

REV. 339 (1992)).

70 Id. (citing Steinberg & Scott, Less Guiltv by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity,
DiminishedResponsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
I Id. at 570.
72 Id. (citing ERIK 11. ERIKSON, IDENITY: YOUTtl AND CRISIS (1968)).

73Id. at 57 1.
74 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).

75See 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
1'Id at 470.
77 Id. at 472 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). The court noted that "'[i]t is increasingly clear that
adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order executive
functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance." Id. at n.5 (quoting Brief for Am.
Psych. Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners).
" Id at 471.
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Additionally, the Miller Court went further than Roper in its reasoning. The
Miller Court accepts that juveniles are not only more prone to making a rash
judgment but further argued that cognitive science supports that juveniles are
amenable to rehabilitation.7 9 Thus, the Court reasons that mandatory LWOP
sentences are not just disproportionate in relation to the level of culpability due to
juvenile offenders, but also foreclose a significant possibility that the offender may
s
be rehabilitated through less severe forms of punishment."
The Court's recognition of the impact of juvenile cognition on a defendant's
status is not limited to inquiries into their culpability for sentencing purposes. In
JD.B v. North Carolina,the Court held that a defendant's age was a factor defining
custody for Miranda purposes." Relying on Roper, the Court stated that age is more
82
than simply a "chronological fact[,]" but is indicative of the way a child thinks.
Specifically, children "generally are less mature and responsible than adults," they
"often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them," and they "are more vulnerable or susceptible to.
• . outside pressures" than adults.8 Applying the developmental framework set out
in Graham and Roper to the context of police interrogation, the Court reasoned that
"events that 'would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm
a lad in his early teens."'84 The majority analogizes to situations in civil contexts,
such as contractual incapacity and limited negligence liability, to support the general
5
proposition that children are not simply "miniature adults." In this way, the Court
expanded its view of developmental juvenile justice beyond culpability.
While the Court's decisions make explicit their view that juvenile's developing
cognition and reduced decision-making competence leaves them more susceptible to
committing crimes, implicit in that rationale is a juvenile's lack of ability to
effectively participate in the judicial process after they have been arrested of the
crime.8 6 In particular, commentators express concerns that juvenile defendants have
a relative incapacity to "deal effectively with police, execute plea agreements, or
participate competently in their trials." 87 Just as juveniles rashness may escalate petty
theft into something more serious, that same rashness might lead to the rejection of
a plea offer that should have been taken or a confession that should not have been
made.

88

"' Id.at 473 ("Life without parole 'forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.' ... It reflects 'an irrevocable
judgment about [an offender's] value and place in society,' at odds with a child's capacity for change.").
80 Id.

" 564 U.S. 261 (2011). J.D•B• concerned a student who had been questioned by a uniformed police
officer, alongside school administrators, in a conference room of the school. Id. at 265. At no point did
the defendant receive Miranda rights. Id. at 266.
12 Id. at 272 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
83 Id
84 Id. (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)).
u Id. at 274.
u' See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a ConstitutionalFramework, 88 TEMP.
L. REV. 675, 679-80 (2016).
SId. at 680.
usSee id.
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B. FurtherResearch on the Capacity ofJuveniles in Legal Contexts
In the years since Miller, social science data has continued to accumulate,
demonstrating that adolescent decisions are often short-sighted and highly prone to
influence by social pressure. 9 In particular, juveniles have been shown to be
susceptible to "reward sensitivity[.]"9 That is to say, if developing adolescents are
informed that their decisions are likely to result in positive external responses (e.g.,
happiness by a parent, approval by a person in authority such as defense counsel or
opposing counsel, etc.), then they are more likely to make those decisions. 9
This is not to say that juveniles are wholly incompetent and that plea bargains
should be banned for youthful offenders altogether. In fact, data supports the
conclusion that juveniles are capable of making decisions equally as rationally as
adults in many contexts. 92 Psychologists divide decision-making into two broad
categories: cool cognition and hot cognition.9" The former involves decisions made
in environments which are non-emotional or non-social contexts (i.e., those that
involved deliberation without high stress or social pressure). 94 Most people develop
95
the ability to fully engage in cool cognitive activities by the age of sixteen.
Conversely, hot cognition occurs in situations that are very stressful and entail high
amounts of social pressure.9" Individuals do not develop the appropriate cognitive
mechanisms to engage in hot cognition until their early to mid-twenties. 9
Any stage in the process of criminal investigation and adjudication is a hot
context under the preceding definition. The threat of punishment is inherently
stressful and emotional. Regarding the plea negotiation context specifically,
juveniles are forced to weigh the threat of punishment against the likelihood of their
conviction at trial. 98 Additionally, this process is mediated by and through counsel,
often with input from parents and other members of the public service.99 Given these
facts, it would seem that plea negotiations meet both criteria to be considered a hot
context: they are both highly stressful and emotional, and the juvenile defendant is
subject to multiple vectors of social pressure. As such, it would stand to reason that
juveniles lack the fully developed cognitive "tools" to be able to navigate the plea
process with the same degree of competency as a similarly situated adult.
" See Laurence Steinburg, Adolescent Developient and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.CLINICAL
PSYCLIOL., no. 1,2009, at 459, 468.
9" Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Diffirences in Afective Decision Making as Indexed by
Peifortnanceon the lawa Gambling Task, 46 DFv. PSYCIIOi. 193, 204 (2010).
11See id. at 204 05.
12 See B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain; Self Control, 22 CURRL.NT DIREcriONS
PSYCIIOL. SC. 82, 83 86 (2013).
" Id. at 83.
14Id.; see also Erika Fountain, Adolescent Plea Bargains: Developmental and Contextual Influences
of Plea Bargain Decision Making (May 2,2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University)
(on file with author).
,See Fountain, supra note 94, at 5.
''ld. at 4--5.
17Id. at 6.; see also Mariam Arain etal., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC
DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013).
"See Fountain, supra note 94, at 1.
I Id.at 24.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 108

This analysis of hot and cold cognition and the results drawn from its application
to the plea bargain process fit squarely alongside psychological research of juvenile
capacity in pre-adjudicative and adjudicative contexts. The Court's decision is J.D.B.
was supported by a wealth of psychological research that demonstrates juveniles
struggles to understand Miranda warnings. 'O In particular, a study by Thomas
Grisso found that juveniles often failed to comprehend the significance of Miranda
warnings, as well as the fundamental rights available to them in the justice system. 101
In addition to the failure to comprehend the vocabulary used in Miranda warning,
Grisso's study found that juveniles struggled to understand the .function of those
rights. 0 2 That is, over one-fourth ofjuveniles believed that their attorney worked for
the court that was hearing their case; many believed that their attorney would be the
ultimate decider of guilt and innocence, and many juveniles believed that invoking
10 3
In each instance, the relative
their right to silence was a punishable offense.
number of adults who believed each of those false statements was significantly
lower. 104 Essentially, many juveniles struggled mightily with legal decision-making
prior to adjudication.
Not a great deal of research has been done on juvenile decision-making in the
plea bargain context specifically. One study found that willingness to plead guilty to
015
a hypothetical plea offer decreased as the detained defendants decreased in age.'
Almost three-fourths of younger adolescents accepted the plea, while only half of
the adults did the same. 106 The study's authors drew two observations. First, the
difference between the younger adolescents and adult's acceptance of a hypothetical
plea is attributable in part to increased compliance with authority figures in the
younger group.'0 7 Second, adolescents are less likely to focus on the overall risks of
their choices in plea bargaining or consider the long-term consequences of the legal
decisions they make.'0o
Another study, which surveyed juveniles between the ages of eleven and
seventeen detained awaiting their trials, found that older adolescents (i.e., late teens)
were more likely to make strategic decisions related to plea bargaining than their
adult counterparts.'0 9 Adolescents aged fifteen to seventeen were more likely to
consider the strength of the evidence against them when considering whether or not
to accept a plea.' 10

! See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 73 (2011).

10,See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68

CA IF. L. REV. 1134, 1134-37 (1980),
d. at 1148.
a

""id. at

1157 59.

104id.

See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial. A Comparison of Adolescents'
andAdults' Capacitiesas Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 351 (2003).
10, See id.
10' See id.at 357.
1Os Id.
""' See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decision of Preadolescentand Adolescent Defndants: Predictorsof
Conflf-sioO5, PIcas, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 L. & HuM. BEIIAV. 253,265, 271 (2005).
"" Id.at 271. Note: The study did not find a differencc in the actual rate of proposed acceptance of pleas.
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Finally, one study suggests that juveniles struggle to understand that rights
afforded to them by law are distinct from, and in fact meant to curtail, authority
12
Rather, they "perceive their rights as privileges afforded by adults."'
figures.'
While this phenomenon clearly undermines the ability of a child to truly understand
their right to silence and counsel, it also endangers the ability of a juvenile to be a
knowing and willing participant in a plea negotiation due to misperception of their
right to trial. Each of the preceding studies suggests that the degree to which a
juvenile defendant critically examines a plea offer is contingent upon their age. In
other words, their decision-making is contingent upon the degree to which they are
cognitively developed.
III.

SPECIFIC HARMS FACED BY JUVENILE DEFENDANTS

A. Kentucky Juvenile Criminal Procedure

The question of whether a juvenile can be tried in adult criminal court depends
on the class of offense the individual was charged with. A child as young as fourteen
years old can be tried as an adult if he or she is "charged with a capital offense, Class
A felony, or Class B felony.""' 3 If the child satisfies this definition, then they are
designated as a youthJul Jinder."4 Recently, Kentucky has moved to reform its
juvenile criminal
law, in particular, its sentencing procedure, to match modem
5
standards. ''
Additionally, Kentucky case law has increasingly moved to recognize that
youthful offenders, though tried as adults, are still children in certain contexts. For
example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized that age is a factor in assessing
a defendant's competency in the context of a Boykin colloquy." 6 However, much
work remains to be done in order to ensure that juveniles receive a fair criminal
procedure which matches their cognitive status.
B. The "Hammer Clause"

Of particular concern is Kentucky's continued acceptance of hammer clauses. A
hammer clause is a "provision in a plea agreement, which in lieu of bail, allows the
defendant, after entry of his guilty plea, to remain out of jail pending final
sentencing."' ' If the defendant "complies with all the conditions" of the clause and
appears at the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth will recommend an agreed
11
12 See Buss, supra note 54, at 48.
1 id

'" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.020(2) (West 2019).
'14 Id.

§ 640.010.

15 For example, Kentucky recently amended its statutes to conform with the Court's holdings in
Miller and Graham. See id. § 640.040(l); see also Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 321
(Ky. 2008).
"' J,D. v. Commonwealth, 211 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a juvenile's age is
to be taken into account when the court considers whether a defendant's guilty plea was entered knowingly
and voluntarily).
117 Knox v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Ky, 2012).
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upon, and reduced, sentence." ' If the defendant "fails to appear as scheduled or
violates any of the conditions" of the clause, a specific and greater (often the
9
maximum allowable by law) sentence will be sought."
The Kentucky Supreme Court has expressed concern with this practice in cases
involving adults. For instance, in McClanahan v. Commonwealth, the court struck
down a hammer clause imposed sentence on the grounds that the trial judge failed
"to exercise independent judicial discretion" when he essentially rubber-stamped the
12
prosecution's agreement without any individualized consideration of the sentence. °
Moreover, in a later case, the court issued a strongly-worded rebuke of the practice
stating that is functioned as "poor man's bail" and was difficult to reconcile with the
principle that the "punishment should fit the crime and the criminal."'' In spite of
the Kentucky Supreme Court's strong language, they have expressed reluctance to
22
interfere too far into the plea bargaining process. 1 To date, the court simply requires
the trial judge to abstain from committing to a sentence before the sentencing hearing
123
and offer individualized consideration prior to issuing a judgment.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD.

Despite the Kentucky Supreme Court's misgivings, the practice of issuing and
adhering to hammer clauses continues on for adults and youthful offenders alike.
However, the practice poses specific problems to the latter class of defendants in
light of the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the reduced decision-making
competence of adolescents. By permitting teenagers to enter into plea agreements
with onerous penalties, we violate the ethos of the growing developmental
framework for juvenile criminal law and risk exposing juveniles to harsh penalties
disproportionate to their culpability.
Given the growing body of research demonstrating juvenile's reduced capacity
in stressful legal scenarios, plea negotiations-where the defendant may be receiving
pressure from multiple sources-present a challenging and dangerous scenario for
many juvenile defendants. 24 In particular, the impulse to make decisions that result
that the juvenile defendant
in approval by authority figures increases the likelihood
25
interest.
best
their
against
decision
a
make
may
Each of these factors weighs against the likelihood that youthful defendants are
competent for complex and highly complex plea negotiations without undue
influence from other factors. In the case of hammer clauses specifically, the danger
is two-fold. First, the defendant may face pressure to agree to an agreement they will
have difficulty complying with and face harsh penalties as a result. Second, the
IX

Id. at 893 94.

I1 Id

12"
308 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Ky. 2010).
2 Knox, 361 S.W.3d at 900.
112Id. (emphasizing that the court was not in the position to inform either the prosecution or the
defense counsel how to negotiate its plea agreement).
See id.
124
See supra Part II.B.
'3 See supra notes 90 91 and accompanying text.
123
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adolescent defendant may have more difficulty complying with the condition after it
is made, especially if the clause imposes harsh penalties for relatively minor
violations. As such, the inclusion of hammer clauses is inappropriate for juvenile
defendants, youthful offender or not. The elimination of hammer clauses, however,
treats only a symptom of a large illness. A broader solution is necessary to prevent
juvenile defendants from incurring harsh penalties that are arguably disproportionate
to the offense they committed.
One solution would be to have a statutorily prescribed hearing prior to any
judicial proceedings, including plea negotiations, to assess a juvenile defendant's
competency. This procedure would differ from the bindover hearing in two primary
ways. First, the hearing would incorporate a modern understanding of juvenile
decision-making, based on the social science accepted in Miller and Roper. This
would involve examining the record and evidence to assess whether a given
defendant is competent to engage in complex plea negotiations. Essentially,
immaturity would be a significant factor in determining the defendant's competence.
One commentator suggested a multiple-pronged approach in which judicial
discretion is balanced against an age-based presumption of incompetence.1 26 Under
this approach, states would pass a statute that sets an age to serve as a developmental
marker which, if the defendant is under, the prosecution must prove his
competence. 27 If the defendant is above that age, then the burden shifts to the
defense, who would have to participate in a hearing to determine if their immaturity
suggests incompetence. 12 1 Such an arrangement would both allow for the defendant's
age to be taken care of while also maintain a balance between each side of the
adversarial process. Second, the presence of expert scientific and medical testimony
should be considered to guide the judge's discretion. In the modern case law,
increased reliance on empirical data has supplanted parental common-sense as the
primary metric for evaluating juvenile competency. Similar hearings are already
29
employed in sentencing hearings in states with discretionary LWOP sentencing. 1
Given the shared theoretical starting point, and the existence of experts used to testify
in similar hearings, it stands to reason that such a solution would be possible to
implement.
Another, more radical approach, would be to heavily curtail, if not eliminate, the
bindover statutes on their face. In essence, this would be a codification of the strong
premise that juveniles are per se incompetent to participate in adult criminal
proceedings. While such a solution would provide significant support to the social
goal of rehabilitation, it does not provide a satisfying answer to society's concern
with justice for heinous crimes. Additionally, it does not take into account that trial

121See, e.g., Kimberly Larson et al., Developing Statutes for Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings: A Guide for Lawmakers, MoDi[S FOR CHtANGE 21 28 (Nov. 2011),
https://www.njj n.org/uploads/digitallibrary/Developing Statutes for Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
A Guide
for Lawmakers-MfC-3 1.30.12 l.pdf[https://perma.cc/WA8C-B8WZ].
27
1 Id. at 27.
129
See id.
" See Scott et al., supranote 56, at 10, 24.
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competence is relative to each defendant." ' It is entirely possible, if not likely, that
13
two sixteen-year old's will be competent and incompetent in different ways. Given
this distinction, a more nuanced approach is necessary.

An ideal, long-term solution would be a system-wide reconsideration of
juvenile's place in the criminal justice system that acknowledges their unique status
as developing individuals while balancing societies need to punish serious offenders.
On one hand, juveniles are underserved by certain procedural protections guaranteed
to them by analogy to adults because their developmental status leaves them less
equipped to navigate such proceedings.132 While the holding of Gault is focused on
3
the respect of the neutral, dispassionate court,'3 the reality is that the formality of
such proceedings is likely to lead to disengagement due to a lack of
comprehension. 134
On the other hand, the shift away from rehabilitation did not arise from the ether.
Society does have a strong interest in ensuring that offenders are held accountable
135
Additionally, the concerns of
for their actions and that communities are secure,
the effectiveness of rehabilitation and indeterminate sentencing expressed by the
majority in Gault were supported by empirical data concerning both juveniles and
adults at the time of the shift.' 36 The increase in youthful offenders statutes and
bindover laws reflects this decreased emphasis in rehabilitation. That being said, the
continued existence of the juvenile court system and related laws supports the
conclusion that rehabilitation is still a goal of juvenile criminal law notwithstanding
increased skepticism.
Ultimately any procedural change must contend with the two above factors: the
developmental status of the child and society's need to punish effectively. Society
can only punish effectively-that is, deter future wrongdoing, protect the public, and
achieve retribution--if the person they are seeking to punish understands why they
are being punished. In the case of a child, this requires teaching "the connection
between their prior [bad] acts, [and] the present response.. . ."'37 This will require a
more individualized assessment of each juvenile defendant; it will require individual
juvenile offenders not as a class of defendants, but as persons with unique
developmental challenges.
Finally, the recognition that children, as developing persons, occupy a unique
place in the criminal justice system requires the judicial system to become more
comfortable with extra-judicial influences, such as psychological, medical, and
13o See Larson et al., supra note

126, at 28.

See id. at 10 -16.
32 See Buss, supra note 54, at 49.
33
1 See 387 U.S. 1,26 27 (1967).
34 See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Buss, supra note 54, at 48 ("[T]he . . .
'

professional distance of the judge [is] likely to alienate children from the decisionmaking process.").
See Buss, supra note 54, at 49
136See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (describing how the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 sought to deemphasize rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing due to its inconsistent
effectiveness); see also Robert Martinson, What Works?- Questions and Answets About Prison Reform,
PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 22 (detailing the lack of empirical data in support of the premise that
rehabilitative efforts in prison had a meaningful effect on recidivism rates in either adults or juveniles).
I37 See Buss, supra note 54, at 50 5 1,
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family service experts. Given the complex and evolving field of developmental
psychology, expert input is required for the judge to accurately communicate with
children and to assess their needs."' A solution that goes further than the
aforementioned burden-shifting approach would be to establish a separate decisionmaking body, consisting of experts, such as social workers or clinical psychologists,
who would approve of plea agreements involving youthful offenders prior to a
judicial ruling. Such a body would function as an administrative agency review board
and make factual findings regarding a defendant's decision-making ability. From
that point, the defendant's capacity is treated as a finding of fact subject to deference
by a reviewing court. If a defendant is judged to be of reduced capacity, increased
scrutiny would be paid to the plea negotiations and the ensuing sentence. While the
ultimate sentence would be handed down by ajudge, her sentencing discretion would
be further restrained by this factual finding, similar to the way a statutory minimum
sentence operates currently. In this way, a defendant would perhaps gain more
individualized attention, while the trial court would not have plenary parenspatriae
power of the initial juvenile court system.
In conclusion, the current criminal justice system, despite progress, presents
juvenile offenders with numerous obstacles to ensure that they receive fair treatment.
Nationally, the Supreme Court has begun to recognize that the culpability of
adolescents is inextricably linked to their cognitive development. The
aforementioned cases frame the Court's understanding of juvenile's developing
cognition as something more than a mitigating factor in a sentencing judge's
assessment of culpability. Rather, the Court's opinions seem to frame this fact as a
foundational principle of criminal law. Within Kentucky, there has been some
progress in ensuring that this scientific truth is reflected in our law, however, much
work remains to be done. At the very least, the Commonwealth could ensure that
youthful offenders are not presented with onerous plea conditions which put them at
risk of harsh penalties for lapses in judgment.

'lId.at 51.

